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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 10-3287 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
         
v. 
 
LASSISSI AFOLABI, 
a/k/a Bogard, a/k/a Fovi 
        
Lassissi Afolabi, 
                                                                           Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 2:07-cr-00785-002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 6, 2011 
 
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, and FUENTES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: December 16, 2011) 
________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Lassissi Afolabi appeals from the criminal judgment entered by the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey.  He argues that the government breached its 
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plea agreement with him and that the District Court improperly calculated his advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines offense level.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1
 
I. 
 Because we write for the parties, we discuss the facts only to the extent necessary 
for the resolution of the issues raised on appeal.  From October 2002 through September 
2007, Afolabi conspired with his wife, Akouavi Afolabi, and others to commit forced 
labor of more than 20 girls, aged 10 to 19.  They recruited the girls from impoverished 
villages in Togo and Ghana and brought them to the United States with fraudulently 
obtained visas.  The girls were required to work in hair-braiding salons for up to 14 hours 
per day, six or seven days a week, and to relinquish all of their earnings.  They were 
beaten and psychologically and sexually abused. 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Afolabi pled guilty to one count of Conspiracy to 
Commit Forced Labor, Conspiracy to Commit Trafficking with Respect to Forced Labor, 
and Conspiracy to Commit Document Servitude, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one 
count of aggravated sexual abuse, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589; and one count of 
Transportation of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b).  The parties agreed that Afolabi’s total Sentencing Guidelines 
offense level was 32, after including a “downward adjustment of 2 levels for acceptance 
of responsibility . . . if Lassissi Afolabi’s acceptance of responsibility continues through 
the date of sentencing.”  (SA22).  The plea agreement further recognized that Afolabi’s 
                                            
1
 We have jurisdiction over Afolabi’s timely appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. 
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sentence was within the sole discretion of the District Judge and that the government was 
not bound by any stipulation to which it received credible contrary evidence prior to 
sentencing. 
After signing the plea agreement and admitting to his culpable conduct, Afolabi 
testified as a defense witness at the trial of his wife and co-defendant, Akouavi Afolabi.  
On direct examination, Afolabi contradicted certain admissions in his plea colloquy, 
denying that his victims were forced to work or to turn over their tips.  Although Afolabi 
recanted these statements on cross examination, the government took the position that 
Afolabi’s testimony demonstrated that his acceptance of responsibility had not continued 
through his sentencing date. 
 At a sentencing hearing on July 12, 2010, the District Court noted that the parties’ 
stipulated calculation of Afolabi’s Guidelines offense level “differ[ed] severely” from the 
probation department’s calculations in its presentence report, which had arrived at a total 
offense level of 46.  (A32).  The Court therefore asked each party to speak on the matter.  
The government supported the plea agreement’s calculation with the exception of its 
downward adjustment for Afolabi’s acceptance of responsibility.  Afolabi agreed with the 
government except to the extent that the government had argued that he should no longer 
receive the benefit of his acceptance of responsibility.  Ultimately, however, the Court 
concluded the parties’ calculation was “flawed.”  (A48).  By the Court’s calculation—
which continued to give Afolabi the benefit of his acceptance of responsibility—
Afolabi’s total offense level was 40.  At a second hearing on July 22, 2010, the Court 
revised its calculation to 38 “in an exercise of caution” and in light of both parties’ 
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arguments that a 2-level increase, applicable where a sexual abuse victim was in the 
“custody, care, or supervisory control of the defendant,” U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3), should 
not apply unless the victim were a minor.  (A23).  Afolabi was sentenced within this 
Guidelines range to 292 months’ imprisonment. 
II. 
 On appeal, Afolabi argues that the government breached its plea agreement with 
him by “rais[ing] issue with the [C]ourt about the calculation of the appropriate base level 
in the first of the sentencing hearings.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 2).  Because Afolabi did not 
raise this objection before the District Court, our review is for plain error.  See Puckett v. 
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009), abrogating United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 
290, 293-94 (3d Cir. 2004).  Under plain error review, a defendant may prevail only if 
(1) there was an error that was (2) clear and (3) affected his substantial rights.  Id.  If 
these three requirements are met, the Court of Appeals has discretion to remedy the error 
if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  
Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
Upon review of the transcript, we conclude that there was no plain error.  At the 
first sentencing hearing, the government argued that the Guidelines calculation stipulated 
in the plea agreement was accurate with the exception of the downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility.  The government was entitled to contest this adjustment 
because of Afolabi’s trial testimony and the terms of the plea agreement.  In any event, 
the government’s position was not adopted by the District Court.  Although the 
government also conceded, in response to the Court’s questioning, that alternative 
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calculations were also supportable under the Guidelines, the government maintained that 
the parties’ calculations in the plea agreement were most appropriate.  After the 
government spoke, defense counsel represented that that “the defendant agrees with the 
[g]overnment’s calculation. . . . The only thing that we disagree on is whether or not there 
was obstruction or acceptance . . . .”  (A45). 
III. 
 Afolabi also argues that the District Court made a procedural error in calculating 
his advisory Guidelines offense level.  We review the District Court’s calculation of the 
Guidelines range for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Fumo, --- F.3d ----, 2011 WL 
3672774, at *16 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2011), as amended (Sept. 15, 2011) (citing United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).  “For example, an abuse of 
discretion has occurred if a district court based its decision on a clearly erroneous factual 
conclusion or an erroneous legal conclusion.” Id. (quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567-68). 
At the July 22, 2010 hearing, the Court explained how it had reached an offense 
level of 38.  The Court applied U.S.S.G. § 2H4.1, which carries a base offense level of 
22, to the group of Afolabi’s forced labor and sexual abuse convictions.  Under 
§ 2H4.1(b)(4), which deals with situations where there was another felony committed 
during the commission or in connection with the forced labor, the Court compared the 
calculation for forced labor with the calculation for criminal sexual abuse.  The Court 
determined that Afolabi’s base level for sexual abuse was 30 pursuant U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1.  
To this base, the Court added 4 levels because the conduct involved forced rape, arriving 
at an offense level of 34.  See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1).  Therefore, the Court added 
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2 levels to arrive at an offense level of 36 for the group under § 2H4.1(b)(4)(B).  The 
Court next added two 2-level enhancements because of the large number of vulnerable 
victims involved, arriving at a total offense level of 40.  U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1)-(2).  
Considering the grouping of the counts and the much lower Guidelines level applicable to 
Afolabi’s conviction for Transportation of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal 
Sexual Activity, the Court did not include a multiple-count adjustment.  Finally, the 
Court gave Afolabi a 2-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, over the 
government’s objection, arriving at a final calculation of 38. 
Afolabi’s argument that the District Court applied the wrong Guidelines section is 
belied by the record.  Afolabi confuses the District Court’s calculations under 
§ 2H4.1(b)(4)(B), related to his sexual abuse of the girls he had forced to work, with a 
calculation of his Guidelines offense level for conviction for Transportation of a Minor 
with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity.  Therefore, Afolabi fails to identify 
any procedural error in the District Court’s calculation of his advisory Guidelines offense 
range. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Afolabi’s sentence. 
